














Abstract: In order to fit the new European legal order on the legal map of the world, we intend to 
focus on the legal order of the European Union. The paper seeks to answer the questions: is the law of 
the European Union a new type of law with specific qualitative determinations? Can it be about 
integration into a supra-national legal order? How can the national values be interwoven with those of 
the European Union? We are witnessing great challenges in the European Union - we are talking 
about integrating into a supra-national legal order, about joining supranational interests. Although it is 
based on international treaties, the Community legal order has characteristics that are fundamentally 
different from the international legal order. In this paper we have analyzed how the relations of the 
Community law interact with the national law. These do not reduce to a single model, but we can 
distinguish several situations depending on the role assigned to the Community provisions and the 
consequences on the existence of the content of national law. We appreciate that only insofar as the 
European Union is founded on an autonomous legal will and on common legal principles and values, 
both for individuals and for nations, the “unity in diversity” is possible. 
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1. Introduction 
Even though there have been discussions and papers on this subject, we believe 
that they have not exhausted the issue, leaving room for academic and scientific 
discussion. Moreover, researching the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in order to analyze the fundamental principles of European Union 
law is an innovative approach on this issue. 
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The novelties also reside in the way the subject is analyzed, as well as the approach 
and explanation, from a different perspective, of the concept of “European Union 
law”. 
We believe that the inventory and analysis of the general principles of European 
Union law is an important and useful approach to the legal world, due to the 
overwhelming importance of this source of law in the European legal order, but 
also in the internal legal order of the Member States. 
As a pillar of the European Union's legality, the general principles of law are 
imposed on the European institutions, being superior to the law deriving from the 
hierarchy of European Union rules. It should be emphasized that these principles 
also apply to the Member States, and to the extent that they act in the field of 
European law. As part of the legality of the Union, it is obvious that they must 
apply either at national or European level in any situation governed by European 
Union law. 
Comparative law must go beyond merely observing the similarities and differences 
between legal systems to analyze the causes of the genesis and evolution of legal 
phenomena, as well as the crystallization of concepts. 
Using the typological-classifier method, analyzing the history of law, we 
distinguish the existence of systems overlapped by law, which raises the question 
of the typology of these systems. 
Due to globalization, there is now a tendency to harmonize or approximate the law 
in the world. The doctrine emphasizes that “the most sensitive” harmonization of 
law is that achieved at regional level, where the European Union is the best 
example (regulations and directives apply in 28 states). Legislative harmonization 
“should not be seen as a legal integration, but as a political cooperation. Legislative 
harmonization does not mean legislative identity, but it seeks to harmonize the 
legal principles and national legal norms organized by specialized fields.” 
We believe that the European Union, since it was not founded by a nation or a 
people, could not be assimilated to a nation state or a constitutional structure. It is 
an international organization, sui generis, created on the basis of treaties concluded 
between sovereign states that have decided it to exercise some common skills for 
an indefinite period of time. We also find it interesting to apply the European 






 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. 
In the Maastricht decision, it is emphasized that the objective behind the Union was 
to create a “union of states [...] as a union as close as possible to the people of 
Europe (organized as states) and not as a state founded on the people of a single 
European nation”. 
We emphasize that in order to be able to talk about a new legal typology, it is first 
necessary to have an autonomous will to command the Union's legal decision-
making process, a will that is not simply a mere arithmetical sum of Member 
States' individual wills (Fuerea, 2006, p. 228), so States commit themselves to be 
subject to a distinct legal will of theirs. Apart from an autonomous will that 
commands legal creation, the new typology also implies the existence of general 
principles that command the essential directions of the construction and 
development of the European legal order (Popa, 2012, p. 63). 
 
2. The European Union Law - A New Legal Typology 
In order to demonstrate the existence of a new legal order - the European legal 
order, we have analyzed the original and the derived European Union law. From 
this analysis, we have noticed that the Union's normative process has evolved 
greatly, from predominantly economic regulations, nowadays new European legal 
regulations have “specific features” that enrich their signification and meanings. 
An institutional right of the Union has been created, with all that this implies: 
sources of law, defining principles and regulations that outline a specific legal 
order. The Union‟s law regulates the legal relations within the European Union, but 
also between the Union and the Member States, it highlights the status of the 
Union's institutions, while defining its attributions and competences. 
Various legislative instruments and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union have gradually created: 
- the Institutional Union law encompassing all the legal norms governing the 
structure and functioning of the European Union bodies; 
- a Union material law covering all the legal norms setting out the objectives of the 
Union and the measures by which they are carried out; 
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- the Procedural law that encompasses all the legal rules governing the procedures 
of European Union law. Thus, another argument for creating a new legal order 
would be that the institutional, material and procedural law of the European Union 
have created a specific legal order. 
The diversity of legal relationships covered by Community law also leads to the 
diversity of the nature of disputes or actions to which the CJEU may be seized. 
(Mazilu, 2006, p. 55) It is therefore possible to distinguish between several types of 
proceedings, which are gradually forming a procedural law of the European Union, 
and which we are referring to a procedural law in the field of administrative law: 
the procedure for direct actions (ordinary law) before the Court of Justice; 
proceedings for preliminary rulings before the Court of Justice; special procedures 
before the Court of Justice; the appeal procedure before the Court of Justice; 
proceedings before the General Court; procedure before the Civil Service Tribunal. 
Moreover, according to Article 20 of the CJEU Statute, the procedure before the 
CJEU involves two phases: the written and the oral phase. These phases are 
followed by the deliberation phase and the adoption of the judgment and the 
execution phase of the judgment. If we are before the Tribunal or the TFP, we add 
the appeal stage. 
As any system of law, community procedural law sets out rules for the conduct of 
processes, among which we mention: 
- Parties to the Community process (Article 19 of the CJEU Statute): Member 
States of the European Union, other subjects of public international law (e.g. States 
party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, third countries), the 
institutions of the European Union, natural and legal persons whether public or 
private, including from third countries; a distinction is made between the 
nominated parties, who do not have to prove a subjective procedural interest, and 
the other parties who have to prove such an interest. 
- the procedural representation and mandatory lawyer (Article 19 of the CJEU 
Statute, Articles 32-36, 38(3) of the Code of Procedure of the CJEU and Articles 
38-42 of the Tribunal Code of Procedure); 
- interventions in the Community process (Article 40 of the CJEU Statute); 
- written procedure (for example, the terms of the call for action - Articles 37-38 of 
the Code of Procedure of the CJEU, Articles 43-44 of the Tribunal Code of 




- Appointment of the rapporteur and the Advocate General (Articles 9 and 10 of the 
CJEU Code of Procedure); 
- procedural language (Article 64 of the CJEU Statute, Articles 29-31, 104 of the 
Code of Procedure of the CJEU, Articles 35-37 of the Tribune Code of Procedure, 
Article 20 of the TFP Code of Procedure); 
- Oral proceedings (e.g. administering evidence - Articles 24-32 of the CJEU 
Statute, Articles 45-54 of the CJEU Code of Practice, procedural exceptions - 
Article 91 (1) of the CJEU Code of Procedure); 
- judgment - deliberation and decision (Articles 27 and 64 of the ECJ CJEU); 
- execution of judgments (Articles 280 and 299 TFEU); 
- procedural deadlines and their calculation (Article 80 of the Code of Procedure of 
the CJEU, Article 101 of the Tribune Code of Procedure); 
- court costs (Article 38 of the CJEU Statute, Articles 63-75 of the CJEU 
Regulation, Articles 72-73 of the CJEU Code of Procedure); 
- ordinary appeals (Articles 56-58 of the CJEU Statute, Articles 112-113 of the 
CJEU Code of Procedure); 
- Extraordinary remedies (Articles 42 and 44 of the CJEU Statute, Articles 97-98 of 
the Code of Procedure of the CJEU, Article 125 of the Tribunal Code of 
Procedure). 
We also point out that the procedural law of the European Union is not suspended, 
with the material right of the European Union, which is somewhat disparate, as it is 
not (yet) encoded. On coding is being discussed more and more often, and there is 
growing concern about the contractual side. The realities of the last century have 
led to the desire to unify the private law, thereby creating the European contract 
law. 
Even though many specialists have objected to the possibility of unification, there 
are many projects that have contributed to this objective: the European Contract 
Law principles drafted by the Lando Commission, the Draft of the European Code 
of Contracts (Gandolfi Code) proposed by the Academy of European Private 
Institutions in Pavia, Joint Reference Document drawn up by the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code, Common Contract Terminology and Common Contractual 
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Principles developed by the Comparative Legislation Society and the Henri 
Capitant Association. 
 
3. The European Union - between Multilingualism and Multilingualism 
Another issue that we have focused on is multilingualism and multi juridism 
characteristic of the Union's order. Contrary to the provisions of the ECSC 
stipulating that French is the only genuine language, the European Union (as well 
as the European Communities) is based on the principle that at least one official 
language of each Member State
1
 becomes an official language of the Union. If at 
the beginning, there were only six Member States and four official languages 
(French, German, Italian and Dutch), we are currently talking about twenty-eight 
Member States and twenty-four official languages (almost each Member State
2
 
having its own official language).
3
 Thus, any of Member State has its own legal 
system, which can be classified according to René David's typology as belonging 
to the family of Roman-German or Anglo-Saxon law. 
The legal will of the Union is the essence of Union law and should not be regarded 
as the simple arithmetical sum of individual states' wills, but as a legal will distinct 
from theirs. This is normal, because we are talking about a Union, so there is the 
problem of typical features, even if there are peculiarities. The sources of European 
law are indeed the architect of the new regional legal order, that of the European 
Union. 
The different forms of expression of law have as a common purpose the creation of 
a legal order, a single type of formal legal source not enough for the complex legal 
regulation imposed by contemporary realities. Moreover, their roles are not kept in 
time, so we notice that their share changes according to several variables. But, in 
the end, these origins subsist, complementing each other or subordinating 
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themselves from the point of view of legal force. Such an example would be the 
pre-eminence of international or European law over the national law. 
The formal origins of law are in close connection, forming together a unitary 
system. As pointed out in the doctrine, “the judge cannot be indifferent to doctrine 
and practice when applying the law; the legislator in his turn cannot ignore the 
doctrine and judicial practice, which leads to the conclusion that the different 
sources of law exert an inevitable influence on each other”. (Popescu, 2000, pp. 
172-173) 
If the Court of Justice has to send or enforce general principles of law under the 
national legal order of the Member States or the international legal order in a case, 
the referral or enforcement can only be made if the principles are 'compatible with 
Community principles and with the specificity of the legal order enshrined in the 
Community texts” (Cotea, 2009, p. 463). The general principles of law gain 
authority in EU law through jurisprudential practice, “but they are always based on 
their consecration in a legal system organized either at Member State level or 
jointly by the Member States or as a result of the nature of the European Union.” 
The problem of knowing the European law is a serious issue from a double 
perspective: the accessibility of European legal norms and multilingualism. 
Moreover, even a jurist has problems in understanding European law, especially as 
a young law, constantly evolving, he did not have time to settle down, so two major 
problems arise at this stage: originality and superiority of the European law. And in 
the European law, the issue of legal norms is questionable. 
Although the European law follows the national legal regime, we note that more 
and more frequently there are written the European rules on this issue (e.g. the 
Convention concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe on the 
obtaining of information and evidence in the field of administration abroad of 15 
March 1978, E.C. Regulation No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation 
between the Member States' jurisdictions in the field of obtaining evidence in civil 
or commercial matters, the Convention concluded under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe on the Prevention of Terrorism of 16 May 2005). 
The case law of the Court of Justice on the general principles of European law is of 
utmost importance. Firstly, it is an example of the creating role of law of the 
European jurisprudence, which contributes to the development of Union law as a 
new legal order. Secondly, the evolution of the general principles demonstrates the 
interaction between the laws of the Member States and the law of the Union. The 
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attitude of the Court of Justice on the general principles of law has evolved greatly 
over the last 60 years. If at first the Court was hesitant, since 1960 it can be noticed 
that the European Court has referred to principles in many areas. Of course, since 
the 1970s, their importance, flexibility and dynamism have been recognized by 
European judges, who have recognized them as rules of Community law. 
Thus, over the years, general principles have become very important, often being 
invoked by the parties, by the general advocates or even by the European judges. 
Today, they are an indisputable part of European Union law, along with primary or 
derived law. The role of the principles is to guarantee the cohesion of Union law 
and its adaptation to changes in the European realities. 
It is interesting that although the legal order of the European Union is governed by 
general principles of law, the Court of Justice has not always defined or applied 
them in the same way, but they are very broadly conceived. Thus, we can see that, 
depending on the situation of the cases, the principles play different roles in the 
legal system of the European Union. Despite these differences, there is still a 
balance - the desire to ensure the uniformity of Union law and to ensure the 
achievement of the objectives enshrined in the Treaties. Although the origin of the 
general principles of EU law remains the domestic law of the Member States, the 
CJEU has some freedom in their choice. For example, with regard to contractual 
liability, the Court “created an autonomous system of liability, while the Treaty 
expressly refers to the general principles common to the Member States” 
(Gheorghiu, 2004, p. 185). Without being constrained by the results of a 
comparative analysis, the Court sets out the trends without being bound by the 
majority trend, examples being those in which it recognized as general principles 
of the European law principles which “were expressly enshrined in only one state 
membership, such as proportionality or legitimate trust.”. (Gheorghiu, 2004, p. 
185) 
The principles of the European Union are mandatory for its institutions and the 
adopted acts or measures, whether are of administrative or legislative nature, which 
violate one of the abovementioned principles, are illegal and they may be annulled 
by the Court of Justice. 
We emphasize that these principles are applied to avoid denial of justice, to fill the 
gaps in the European Union law and to strengthen the coherence of this right. 





4. Integrating the Community Law into the Internal Legal Order 
Since the Communities are international organizations with the legal personality 
distinct from the Member States, there is the issue of the relationship between 
Community and domestic law arises. The adoption of the rules of Community law 
is particularly an important issue, but not sufficient. They need to be effective, not 
to remain at the abstract level, but to produce legal effects. As Community law is 
an autonomous system, there is a need to integrate it into the law of the Member 
States. This integration implies that it is part of the national law of each EU state, 
so it applies directly. The direct applicability of Community law therefore requires 
a basic principle, from which it derives a second principle linked to the hierarchy 
of the two systems, which is the priority (the supremacy) of Community law over 
the national law. (Manolache, 2006, p. 24) 
The Principle of Direct Applicability  
The principle of direct applicability finds a confirmation in art. 189 CE, but only as 
regards the regulations, which are stated to be of direct applicability in all Member 
States. For the rest of the Community normative acts and for C.E.CO, the Court of 
Justice has been given the role of stating this principle when solving certain causes. 
Thus, in Van Gend en Loos (05.02.1963, 26/62.1), the Court found that the Treaty 
had as object the establishment of a “common market”, which implicitly 
encompasses all Community justices, the Treaty was applied, and it was not 
adopted only to regulate the relations between Member States. It has also been 
shown that the Treaties constitute a new legal order of international law to which 
the States have transferred their competence, and the subjects of law and 
obligations are not only the States, but also their nationals whose national 
jurisdictions must guarantee their exercise rights and to ensure the fulfillment of 
their obligations. (Kaczorowska, 2011, p. 212) 
Later, by COSTA/E.N.E.L. (15.07.1964, 6/64) decision, the Court returned to the 
formations in the aforementioned judgment, replacing the wording “legal order of 
international law” with “own legal order” and “independence” of Community law 
was replaced by its “integration” into the legal system of the Member States. 
The replacement of “international legal order” with “own legal order” is justified in 
terms of the differences that exist between them. Thus, the “legal order” of the 
Communities has as its source the conventional law adopted by the states, as well 
as the unilateral acts, respecting the derived right, although they are recognized as 
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fundamental sources and principles, each having a well-established position in the 
legal hierarchy, and its norms address mainly the private individuals. 
Another difference is that the settlement of disputes arising between the subjects of 
this right is not left to the parties involved. The Court has held that the principles of 
domestic law apply to the extent that they are not incompatible with the 
Community legal order. 
Differentiation of Rules 
The Court has established that, according to this principle, the Community law is 
directly integrated into the law of the Member States, without allowing states to 
choose between dualist or monistic theories, as the mechanism must be applied 
without the need for internal measures to enforce the Community law (03.04.1968 
Malkerei Firm, 28/67, 211). 
As a result of this situation, the private individuals (physical or moral) can invoke 
Community law before the national authorities, including tribunals, both for the 
recognition of their rights and for the annulment of the effect of the domestic legal 
acts which are contrary to the Community law. 
The direct application of Community law has a number of differences depending 
on the category of Community rules that are invoked, as well as the nature of the 
direct effect and the possible exceptions that exist. In this respect, analyzes made 
by the literature are distinguished
1
 either by the criterion of direct effect force and 
conditionality, or by the categorization of the sources of Community law, although 
each of these classifications does not always cover all the essential elements that 
result from the application of the criterion. 
The Direct, Unconditional and Complete Effect 
The sources of Community law that have this effect can be invoked without any 
condition by any physical or moral entity, both vertically (in disputes with state 
bodies) and horizontally (in disputes with other physical or moral persons). This 
category includes: 
- Regulations, which are community acts specific to direct applicability, creating 
rights and obligations for all. This can be argued with art. 189 of the EC Treaty. 
Which states that the regulation is “directly applicable”. 
                                                          
1 Hugues Dumont, Présentation générale des changements induits par le Traité de Lisbonne, in (de 




- Decisions that are not directly applicable, but it was considered that those 
decisions addressed to individuals in certain areas (competition) may be sources of 
rights and obligations for them, being assimilated in these cases to the regulations. 
The effect of the other decisions will be analyzed later. 
- The general principles, which are of direct applicability, as by their generality 
they have to be respected in all cases and unconditionally. 
The Direct, Conditional and Complete Effect 
This category includes community acts that can be invoked in any litigation, but it 
is necessary to meet the conditions for this purpose. There are included here the 
conventional documents, namely community-building treaties and international 
treaties. 
Constitutive Treaties 
In Van Glend en Loos, the Court ruled that Community law stemming from the 
constituent treaties has no direct autonomous applicability. However, there are two 
general indications that the provisions conferring rights and express obligations for 
private individuals are directly applicable, as well as those which impose well-
established obligations on Member States or Community institutions. 
If these conditions are met, those provisions are directly applicable without the 
need for further enforcement, specific procedures or complementary measures. 
Their self-exertion enables the private individuals to invoke these provisions 
directly before the national courts. The scope of this direct effect was subsequently 
extended by the case law of the Court, including, besides the State's obligation not 
to do (not to make reservations to subordinate the application of the treaties to any 
internal normative act, not to require the adoption of normative provisions internal 
implementation of treaty provisions) and obligations to do (not to leave any margin 
of appreciation to states in fulfilling their obligations) (Ziller, 2003), as well as to 
situations in which the necessary additions have not been made by internal law (the 
application of the principles of non-discrimination in employment or pay, even if 
the internal law did not take them). Within the constitutive treaties, the direct effect 
of some provisions coexists with its absence in other provisions. It is the case of the 
provisions which determine the obligations of states with a very general feature, as 
well as under conditional or insufficiently specified provisions. 
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The obligations laid down in very general terms refer to general policies: 
improvement of the working conditions of workers (Article 117 EC), exchange rate 
policy (Article 107 EC) which cannot be invoked by individuals as having direct 
effect in the case of the conditional or insufficiently specified provisions, as stated 
by the Court, in the case of art. 90 C.E. on the possibility that some companies 
managing a public service may be exempted from the general rules of the treaty, 
that this is a strict interpretation, and that the important role, in this respect, 
remains to the national judge; in the case of art. 92 and 93 C.E. on state aid granted 
to some companies, they also have no direct effect, since the incompatibility of 
such aid with the Common Market is not absolute, but subject to notification by the 
Commission under the control of the Court. 
International Agreements 
As regards the international agreements, the Court has decided that their provisions 
may be invoked directly if they confer rights on the States, but also on private 
persons, or whether the application of such treaties to the domestic legal order is 
based on the clear depositions, which do not require other internal normative acts. 
The Direct Conditional and Limited Effect  
They are considered to have a direct, conditional and restrictive effect on directives 
and decisions addressed to the Member States. There are, however, opinions which 
argue that they would not have direct effect, as the Treaties do not mention the 
rules in this regard, which implies, per a contrario, that they do not recognize this 
effect. It is recognized at the same time that the reasoning is not determined, the 
direct applicability must be precisely determined. It is also argued in the same way 
the fact that the decisions that are not of general applicability need to be notified, 
which is why they are considered to impose only a result obligation, implying the 
adoption of national legal regulations, which is why they are not of direct 
applicability, any obligations which they prescribe should result from internal 
regulations. 
However, the Court has ruled on the principle of direct applicability, according to 
which the national courts must apply the directives, and the mandatory nature of 
the directives implies that individuals may invoke them. It was thus considered that 
the provisions contained in the directives were invoked, if they had not been 
transposed or had been misapplied upon expiry of the period of application. States 
therefore have the possibility to determine what measures are to be taken. Although 




and they cannot prevent individuals from complying with the obligations laid down 
in the directives. The direct effect of the directives is the absolute condition for the 
national judge to exercise his powers in this respect. In other cases, the Court has 
ruled that directives do not have direct effect unless they result from all their 
provisions that they are likely to produce direct legal effects between Member 
States and private individuals. 
The Court also found that the unconditional and sufficiently precise provisions are 
likely to produce direct effects. This possibility for States to choose the means they 
deem appropriate to comply with the provisions of the directives may be 
inconsistent with the actions of individuals who may use their rights before the 
national courts, whose rights may be determined precisely on the basis of the 
provisions of the directives. It has also been stressed that the directives do not 
create obligations for individuals so that individuals cannot rely on them in 
disputes between them, and the state cannot invoke them against private 
individuals. This effect of the directives stems from the case-law of the Court, 
which ruled that a directive cannot create obligations for an individual and cannot 
be invoked against it. The decisions are assimilated to the directives in terms of 
direct effect, in which case the same arguments are valid for justifying the 
applicability of this principle, except that they do not necessarily imply the 
adoption of national regulations for their application either because they are not 
addressed to States, or because the obligations they impose are not addressed to 
individuals. 
The Court has established the same jurisprudence for decisions as in the case of 
directives, although the number of cases is much lower. 
The Consequences of Applying the Direct Effect Principle 
The principle of direct applicability of Community law has implications for both 
member states of the communities, as well as individuals and national judges. 
The Member States are in a position of not to being able to change the addressed 
Community provisions, which are binding on the Member States concerned 
(obviously taking into account the category of legal rules in question as discussed 
above). Individuals have the opportunity to invoke the Community law at any time 
under the conditions laid down by Community regulations. 
The national judges are bound to apply the Community law, but when judges are 
faced with a situation that requires internal competence, they will apply the right of 
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each state. If the national judge asks for an injunction, the Court may indicate to 
him the elements of Community law on which to solve the case. (Dony, 2012, p. 
32) 
It recognizes a direct vertical applicability (invoking community provisions 
towards the state and its bodies) and horizontal applicability (between private 
individuals). 
The Primacy of Community Law 
The treaties establishing communities do not contain provisions on the primacy of 
Community law over the internal ones, together with the direct effect, the primacy 
being the two pillars of the Community legal order. The issue of the primacy of 
Community law over the domestic law of the Member States can be regarded as an 
expression of the issue of the relationship between public international law and 
domestic law. According to theory and practice in this field, there are two doctrines 
on the relationship between the two systems: monist and dualist doctrine. 
Unlike this situation in the public international law, in the system of Community 
law, Member States are obliged to recognize the primacy of Community law over 
domestic law. The basis for this situation is the agreement of the states to be 
members of these communities and to accept the special jurisdiction created in 
accordance with the constitutive treaties that have been negotiated and to which the 
consent of each state was expressed according to the provisions of the treaty and 
the internal regulations, respectively by referendum in the last instance. By 
accepting the principle of the integration of the Community legal norms into the 
national law of each state and the fact that rights and obligations derive from any 
subject of law, in any situation where the question of the jurisdictional recognition 
of these rights and obligations is raised, the court will have to decide when the 
treaties do not contain express provisions, being bound to decide between the 
application of Community law and the national law. 
The fact that the Treaties do not contain express provisions in this respect is 
considered a political precaution of the initiators of the European Communities by 
which the anti-federalist feelings of founding states could be preserved, which 
could not have accepted the conditionality of the community construction. It has 
been proven that the practice has raised a number of issues that the Court of Justice 
has to solve (in many situations, following national court requests). Thus, the role 
of the Court of Justice has been to establish the primacy of Community law over 




Establishing the Principle 
The foundation of this principle has been established by the Court, through the 
global interpretation of the Community legal norms. That principle is also found in 
the Van Gend En Loos judgment (referred to above in the examination of the direct 
effect principle), but it is also stated in the Costa c.E.N.E.L. (July 15, 1964, 6/64), 
in which the Court summarizes the original features of the European Communities: 
institutions with a legal order, integrated with the national legal system of the 
Member States, with their own personality and legal capacity, represented on the 
international relations and with its own powers conferred by the transfer of 
competence agreed by the Member States, as well as the existence of a Community 
normative framework applicable to the Member States and their citizens. This is 
where the legal foundations of the principle of primacy of Community law 
stemming from constitutive treaties and other sources have been established, which 
must be integrated into the internal legal order of each Member State and which 
have as a corollary the impossibility for all states to prevail over the unilateral legal 
norms against the common legal order, accepted on the basis of the expression of 
consent. 
The Application Domain 
The principle of primacy refers to the totality of sources of Community law, which 
therefore have all a legal force superior to domestic law, regardless of the category 
to which they belong. The internal law of all Community states must be in full 
compliance with Community law, irrespective of the internal hierarchy of those 
rules. In other words, the state cannot even invoke its constitutional provisions in 
order not to apply a community norm. This is all the more obvious in the case of 
contractual rules between private-law matters. (Druffin-Bricca & Henry, 2011) 
This primacy is properly applied in the case of revising institutional treaties or acts 
that are subject to the approval of states, on the basis of constitutional provisions, 
that in these situations it is the introduction of new, different Community rules, 
subject to specific adoption procedures. In court jurisdiction, contradictory 
situations may arise in which national judges will be tempted to apply domestic 
provisions - and the judges of the Court of Justice will not have legal texts for the 
annulment of such rulings contrary to Community law. The action for failing to 
comply with Community obligations may be used in this respect. 
For these reasons, the Court sought to impose the principle of primacy of 
Community law by limiting the autonomy of national law. It has thus been ruled 
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that the act of a state of not withdrawing from its legislation a provision contrary to 
Community law constitutes a breach of Community obligations. The action for 
non-fulfillment of the obligations does not lead to the invalidation of the non-
compliant internal legal rules, but only to the obligation of the state to take the 
necessary measures for the cessation of the respective situation. In other judgments 
of the Court of Justice (Simmenthal 09.03.1978, 106/77, RTDE 1978, 381) it has 
been ruled that a national judge has the duty to respect the Community law and to 
remove the application of any contrary provision in the domestic law. Regarding 
the application of sanctions, especially the criminal ones, they are devoid of the 
legal basis if they are contrary to the Community law, and they should rule on the 
annulment by higher courts. It has also been recognized the interpretation of any 
confusing provision in the spirit of Community law. 
Once the European Communities and subsequently the European Union have been 
established, the Member States have entrusted a part of their sovereignty to 
supranational bodies, either by renouncing or by transferring some national 
attributes. These attributes cannot be returned to the authorities of the Member 
States. That is why the transfer of power to the Community institutions is 
considered to have an irreversible nature. The appreciation of the nature of the 
power transfer can be made with regard to the integrity and unity of the granted 
powers. It is not permissible for one or more Member States to be able to give up 
less of the attributes in question while other states have to accept important 
renunciations in order to reach subordination or inequality. 
The principle of equal treatment must be fully respected. Member States cannot 
achieve any advantages other than those which can be achieved through the 
equitable sharing of rights and duties and through the correct application of 
Community legal acts. When, owing to the inaction of a Community authority in 
the application of a legal provision, it can be inferred that the latter is no longer 
present and some national rules may become more and more harmful; the Member 
States cannot retain freedom discretionary action, and the Community does not lose 
its authority, although some of its organs are guilty. The national rules must not be 
incompatible with Community principles. 
The principle of Community solidarity must be taken into account in order to 
ensure a balance between the Community's partners. The basis of the Communities 
and the Union will be a new legal order, which will have to be imposed in addition 




law can have a stand-alone existence independent of national legal systems or will 
need to be integrated into these systems or a hierarchical efficacy system. 
(Dominique, 2004) 
The Community Acquis is the set of common rights and obligations that apply to 
all Member States. It includes: 
• the content, principles and policy objectives of the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities as well as of all agreements that have altered them over 
time, including the Treaties on the Accession of New Members; 
• The mandatory acts are adopted to implement treaties (directives, regulations, 
decisions); 
• The recommendations and opinions adopted by the institutions of the European 
Union; 
• Other acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union (declarations, 
resolutions, framework decisions, etc.); 
• Joint actions, common positions, signed conventions, resolutions, declarations 
and other acts adopted on the Common Foreign and Security Policy; 
• Joint actions, common positions, signed conventions, resolutions, declarations 
and other acts adopted on justice and home affairs; 
• International agreements concluded by the Communities and those concluded by 
EU Member States on the activity of the latter; 
• the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
The Community Acquis is synonymous with Community law in a broad sense and 
it is in a continuous development and transformation, as some legislative acts have 
been repealed and others are adopted. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The European Union is an important global actor, representing a great commercial 
power and a significant donor in the humanitarian assistance. Described sometimes 
as civilian or normative power, this “reflects the fact that its means are – necessary 
due to its lack of military capacity - of an economic, diplomatic and political 
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nature, rather than coercive. In other words, the EU relies mainly on “soft power” 
worldwide. (Craig & Gráinne, 2009, p. 210) 
“Regional and voluntary integration is the only one capable of allowing nations to 
flourish without reneging on and reinforcing material dimensions without 
threatening,” (Constantinesco, 1997, p. 39) said Leontin-Jean Constantinescu, 
considering that the best example is the European Communities (today's European 
Union). 
It is interesting the approach of the Union from the perspective of sociology 
(Baltasiu, 2007, pp. 365-367): the Union as a social community. The society is a 
network of communities, not the sum of people, but a network of social 
interactions. 
The future of the European Union is closely linked to the capacity to function 
under the Treaty of Lisbon, the possibility of attracting and co-opting new Member 
States, and eliminating discrepancies between them. 
Although considered to be a unique institutional and functional model in the world, 
Jacques Delors highlighted that the European Union would represent “a necessity 
and an ideal to reach our philosophical and cultural roots” and through which “we 
will participate in a collective adventure, uniting peoples for good, not evil.” 
(Alomar, Daziano, & Garat, 2010, p. 121) 
Questions on the future of European Union law are common. However, the 
functioning of the Union's institutions must be ensured, the institutional balance 
must not be abandoned, and the separation of powers must still be guaranteed. 
Europe will not be created all at once. The European project will continue to pull 
itself from the force of immediate action on limited but decisive elements of 
integration. The Common Foreign and Security Policy will be endowed with a 
“security-defense” dimension. The European Security and Justice Area is 
progressing considerably. Europe's success will depend on its heterogeneity, where 
cultural diversity is the most valuable asset. 
In relation to the international legal order, the specificity of the European Union 
lies in the fact that it was born after the treaties concluded by the Member States 
and the normative acts issued by the Union institutions on the basis of and in the 
application of the Treaties. 
Although challenged by the fact that it is an “incomplete law by its nature” (Bergé 




international law”, this “incompleteness” has led to the finding of original solutions 
and methods allowing the Union's rules and principles to interact with the national 
and international environment. Some authors have found that “domestic law, 
European law and international law mix, overlap, complement, consolidate, 
compete with one another or cancel one another.” The permanent tension between 
the three major legal levels - national, regional and international - shows in any 
case today that the quasi-absolute autonomy of European law is a myth and that its 
dependence on international and national law has increased considerably during the 
European construction. (von Ihering, 2002, pp. 6-7) Moreover, in order to be able 
to apply the European law, you need to integrate its specificity into the wider 
ensemble created by the international and national law. 
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